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ABSTRACT 
ADS-B is one of the significant implementation systems of 
NextGen, to help pilots and air traffic controllers to create a 
safer, and more efficient National Airspace System (NAS). 
First, this research paper will briefly describe the ADS-B 
system, its design structure, ADS-B In and ADS-B Out 
systems, its efficiency both in pilot applications and in air 
traffic control applications, and then discuss about the system 
safety analysis. The preliminary hazard analysis and fault tree 
analysis will be done for the identified and selected hazards, 
and will be briefly discussed. The paper will conclude by 
providing recommendations to prevent/mitigate the hazards 
identified. 
General Terms 
Research Paper 
Keywords 
ADS-B, NextGen, human factors, safety, surveillance, PHA, 
FTA. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fastest mode of transportation is the air transportation and 
generally, it is considered to be safe. The United States 
National Airspace System (NAS) reported that it has achieved 
low accident rates since 1960 with a dramatic decrease in 
major accidents (Boeing, 2016). There were approximately 
3.8 billion air travelers in 2016 and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) predicts that there will be a 
3.7% annual growth rate and expects about 7.2 billion 
passengers to travel by air in 2035 (International Air 
Transport Association  [IATA], 2016). Meanwhile, the 
worldwide traffic of air cargo is expected to grow by an 
average of 4.2 percent per year over the next 20 years 
(Boeing, 2016-2017). Though, the forecasted growth in both 
passenger and cargo flights is expected to be nearly 5% in the 
coming decades the existing air traffic management system 
cannot handle this growth.  
Apart from the increasing demands related to the capacity, the 
United States national airspace is also under pressure to 
reduce the operating costs, traffic congestion, delays, accident 
rates and greenhouse gas emissions, and at the same time, it 
has to ensure safety. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has to address the current and future air traffic 
congestion, and it is also poised to handle the future demand. 
To handle these issues efficiently, FAA has been developing 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
with the purpose of changing the way the NAS operates.  
NextGen will meet future demand and support the economic 
viability of the air transportation system. It will improve the 
safety and support environmental initiatives such as reducing 
the traffic congestion, green gas house emissions, noise, and 
fuel consumption through increased energy efficiency. As a 
part of NextGen to achieve the above-mentioned goals, FAA 
has determined that it is essential to shift from ground-based 
surveillance and navigation system to more dynamic and 
accurate airborne-based systems and procedures which will 
help to enhance the capacity, reduce delays, and improve the 
environmental performance. Hence, as a part of NextGen 
operation, the Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast 
(ADS–B) system has been developed and installed worldwide. 
This paper will discuss the Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B), the ADS-B IN and ADS-B 
OUT systems, identify the hazards related to ADS-B in 
general and then analyze the human factor issues related to 
ADS-B system, discuss the current safety regulations related 
to ADS-B system and conclude by providing few 
recommendations to mitigate the  identified hazards. 
 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
An online literature search was carried out using Google 
Scholar, Science Direct, Hunt Library of Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, Web of Science and Federal 
Aviation Administration website. The database was filtered to 
collect the appropriate data related to the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) system, related 
hazards, and its role in the success of the aviation industry.  
System safety is important to the development of any system 
mainly to reduce the risks, protect lives and resources by 
preventing mishaps. The foremost aim of system safety is on 
hazards analysis and it is important to collect and record the 
information, such as “the prime hazard causal factors (e.g., 
hardware failure, software error, human error, etc.), the major 
mishap category for the hazard (e.g., fire, inadvertent launch, 
physical injury, etc.), and any safety critical (SC) factors that 
will be useful for subsequent analysis (e.g., SC function, SC 
hardware item, etc.)” (Ericson, 2015). Based on this system 
safety aim, the hazards related to ADS-B were identified and 
a Preliminary Hazard Analysis was conducted using the 
methodology obtained from MILSTD-882E for System Safety 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2012). The identified ADS-B 
system hazards were organized on the basis of the checklist 
provided in the book Risk Assessment: Theory, Methods, and 
Applications by Rausand (Rausand, 2011, p. 67) and the 
format of the table is adapted from the textbook Hazard 
Analysis Techniques for System Safety by Erickson (2015). 
Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix was adapted from MILSTD-
882E for System Safety (DOD, 2012). As the ADS-B system 
is very complex, out of the different hazard categories 
identified, this paper discusses only the hazards that occur due 
to human error especially three hazards namely pilot error, 
ATC error, and error that occurs due to miscommunication of 
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both was further analyzed using the fault tree analysis 
methodology (Ericson, 2015). 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance–
Broadcast (ADS–B) 
The most advanced surveillance technology in the aviation 
industry is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast 
(ADS–B) system. The term ADS-B refers to Automatic – A 
system which transmits information without the input from 
pilot and ATC; Dependent – the information transmitted with 
regard to the position, altitude, and velocity of the aircraft is 
dependent on the global positioning system (GPS) and on the 
navigation avionics of the aircraft; Surveillance – It provides a 
method for determining various aspects of the aircraft’s 
position and intent; and Broadcast – The information 
transmitted is available to anyone with suitable receiving 
equipment (Civil Aviation Safety Authority [CASA], 2012).  
ADS-B is the major component of NextGen as it is intended 
to move air traffic control (ATC) to a satellite-derived aircraft 
location system from a radar-based system. The ADS-B 
technology creates a more precise surveillance interface 
between an aircraft and the ATC based on the combination of 
the positioning source of the aircraft, avionics equipment and 
the infrastructure on ground (Federal Aviation Administration 
[FAA], 2017, a). ADS-B equipment is an advanced 
surveillance system with air to air, and air to ground 
applications.  It involves two main components namely the 
Airport Surface Detection System–Model X (ASDE-X) and 
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) ground 
surveillance systems. These two systems link ADS-B with 
other surveillance technologies and this facilitates the ATC to 
track the aircraft movement on ground and airport ground 
vehicles. It provides more precise information to both pilots 
and air traffic controllers to keep the aircraft safely separated 
on runways and in the sky (FAA, 2017, a). 
3.1 ADS-B System Design 
The ADS-B system consists of both airborne and ground 
components. The ground components are GPS (Global 
Positioning System) Clock, ADS-B receiver, and antenna, 
ADS-B situational display and communication link. The 
function of ADS-B receiver and the antenna is to receive the 
messages broadcast from aircraft, while the communication 
link transmits the messages to the surveillance data processing 
unit of the air traffic control from the ground station. The 
function of ADS-B situation display is to exhibit the position 
of the aircraft and to indicate the vector just like the radar-
based surveillance system (CASA, 2012). The ADS-B 
airborne infrastructure consists of the navigational source the 
GPS, ADS-B Avionics (standalone box for UAT), Control 
Panel, Barometric Altimeter, Altitude Encoding Altimeter, 
Antenna for ADS-B, Transponder, and GPS, Antenna 
Duplexer, and Flight Management System (FMS) (FAA, 
2017,b). The function of GPS is to collect and broadcast the 
position of the aircraft position and indicate the vector 
information to the ADS-B emitter. While the ADS-B avionics 
system encode and transmit ADS-B messages and the 
function of Antenna for ADS-B, Transponder, and GPS is to 
support both ADS-B IN and OUT i.e., to support ADS-B 
OUT, a single antenna is required at the bottom of the aircraft 
and to support ADS-B IN, two antennas are required (one at 
the top and one at the bottom of the aircraft). Antenna 
Duplexer enables to share the antenna between the 
transponder and ADS-B unit. Barometric altimeter develops 
the aircraft altitude, and the Altitude Encoding Altimeter 
organizes the information about the altitude that is transmitted 
by the ADS-B message and altitude transmitted by the 
transponder. Control Panel permits the pilot to key in the 
inputs and select aircraft identification, emergency pulse etc. 
and FMS helps to manage the flight plan (FAA, 2017,b). 
Based on these components ADS-B is classified into two 
main subsystems namely ADS-B IN and ADS-B OUT (Fig.1). 
 
3.2 ADS-B IN and ADS-B OUT Systems 
The basic design of ADS-B consists of two subsystems such 
as “ADS-B IN” and “ADS-B OUT”. ADS-B OUT is the part 
of the system that transmits the data about the aircraft such as 
its altitude, airspeed, velocity, and location, to the ADS-B 
ground stations and the avionics, is shown in Fig.2. 
 
While ADS-B IN is the receiving part which when equipped 
in an aircraft interpret the data received from other aircraft on 
an electronic flight bag in the cockpit. This system requires 
 International Journal of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering 
Volume 5 – No.2, April 2018 
11 
ISSN (O): 2393-8609 
ADS-B OUT system with an “in” capability receiver 
(Houston, 2017). To enhance the efficiency along with the 
receiver part some aircraft are also equipped with CDTI 
(Cockpit Display Traffic Information) (CASA, 2012) and 
their related avionics is illustrated clearly in Fig.3. 
 
3.3 Efficiency of ADS-B system 
Capezzuto (2005), Director of Surveillance and Broadcast 
Services, FAA, classified the efficiency / capability  of ADS-
B system into four types namely (i) Air to Air application - 
which transmits data from one aircraft to another in the air 
and hence improves the separation standards, improves low 
visibility approaches, enhances see and avoid, and enhances 
operations for en route air to air, (ii) Air to Ground 
applications i.e., applications that require the transmission of 
the data from an aircraft to fixed ground users which enhances 
both radar and non-radar airspace surveillance coverage area, 
(iii) Ground to Ground application  which transmits data from 
aircraft/vehicle to others on the ground which in turn 
improves the taxiway navigation and ultimately improves 
surface traffic management, and (iv) Ground to Air self – 
contained application which transmits the weather information 
to the cockpit which in turn reduces of controlled flight into 
terrain  (Capezzuto, 2005).  
These applications were categorized into three groups by 
Results Through Collaboration in Aviation (RTCO, 2002). 
They are 
1) Ground-based surveillance applications such as ATC 
surveillance in airspace with radar and non-radar coverage, 
surface surveillance at the airport, and aircraft derived data for 
ground-based ATM tools. 
2) Aircraft-based surveillance applications – (i) increases the 
situational awareness by enhancing the visual acquisition of 
traffic, enhancing traffic awareness on the airport surface, 
during flight operations and by enhancing the successive 
visual approaches. (ii) improves the airborne separation by 
enhancing the in trail procedure and merging the operations. 
3) Other applications such as ramp control/gate management, 
monitoring the noise, enhances the situational awareness of 
obstacles and Search and Rescue (SAR) operation. 
On the other hand, FAA (FAA, 2017 c) classified these 
applications in different perspective i.e., (1) ADS-B in Pilot 
applications which includes the Traffic Information Services – 
Broadcast (TIS-B), Flight Information Services – Broadcast 
(FIS-B), ADS-B in Interval Management Applications, In 
Trail Procedures, Traffic Awareness System and (2) ADS-B 
in Air Traffic Control applications, which is briefly described 
below. 
3.3.1 ADS-B in Pilot Applications 
In the cockpit, ADS-B offers more safety and efficiency by 
providing up to the second information about traffic, and 
weather, through the ADS-B In receivers that can receive 
UAT broadcasts (FAA, 2017 c). It offers two broadcast 
services namely Traffic Information Services – Broadcast 
(TIS-B) and Flight Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B). 
TIS-B increases the situational awareness of the pilots by 
broadcasting the accurate real-time traffic position reports that 
are relevant to the aircraft which is properly equipped. As the 
data is displayed to both the pilots and ATC they have shared 
situational awareness. FIS-B is available only to those aircraft 
which can receive data over 978 MHz (UAT) (FAA, 2017, c). 
It spontaneously transmits weather information such as 
turbulence, lightning, icing, and cloud tops based on both 
national and regional focus to all equipped aircraft. This real-
time aeronautical and weather information helps the pilots to 
efficiently plan a safe flight path and during the flight, it helps 
them to make strategic decisions to avoid the hazardous 
weather conditions. 
In Interval Management Applications, ADS-B increases the 
situational awareness of the crew by providing guidance 
regarding the speed which helps the crew to maintain an 
interval from target aircraft and fly safely. This is more 
effective in air traffic control at the oceanic regions, en route, 
and at terminals. As it provides efficient direct flight path, and 
low-variance spacing between aircraft it reduces the fuel burn, 
noise, and emissions (CASA, 2012). In Trail Procedures (ITP) 
is an advanced ADS-B In application which allows the 
aircraft to fly at ideal flight levels. It also increases the fuel 
economy, reduces the emission by avoiding the turbulent 
altitudes. ADS-B Traffic Awareness System (ATAS) helps to 
detect the potential traffic encounters, alert the pilots and thus 
reduces the air collisions to a greater extent (Richards, Brien, 
& Miller, 2010). 
3.3.2 ADS-B in Air Traffic Control applications 
The real-time accuracy of the data provided by ADS-B 
enhances safety by helping the air traffic controllers to 
efficiently and effectively manage the air traffic for improved 
safety and capacity (FAA], 2017 d). These services are 
provided through Wide Area Multilateration (WAM), Airport 
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), and Advanced 
Surveillance Enhanced Procedural Separation (ASEPS). 
WAM can be installed in areas where radar service is 
unavailable or limited. It is a ground-based surveillance 
system that offers surveillance outside the range of radar 
coverage. It enhances the efficiency, safety, and capacity by 
reducing the flight delays, diversions, cancellations, and fuel 
emissions (FAA, 2017 d). ASSC increases situational 
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awareness in all kinds of weather by improving the 
surveillance at the airport surface. It plays a significant role in 
preventing the runway collisions, helps to correlate the 
information regarding the flight-plan with real-time position 
displays and provides accurate surveillance data (FAA, 2017 
e). 
The subsequent level of NextGen is the Advanced 
Surveillance Enhanced Procedural Separation (ASEPS) 
project. Its aim is to improve the oceanic surveillance. FAA is 
evaluating two methodologies to improve the surveillance 
coverage in oceanic regions through Space-Based ADS-B 
reports and more frequent Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
– Contract (ADS-C) reports (FAA, 2017 f). Space-Based 
ADS-B is an approach to move from the present system of 
ADS-B ground stations to radios hosted on satellites, which 
will enable enhanced surveillance across the entire globe 
(FAA, 2017 f). It will help to track the aircraft that might fly 
anywhere in near real-time and will increase the safety and 
efficiency for all users. It will also reduce the separation 
standards in oceanic airspace and improve precise approach in 
non-radar airspace and provide accurate and real time 
information for search and rescue operations (FAA, 2017 f). 
3.4 System Safety Analysis of ADS-B 
As discussed ADS-B offers a lot of advantages like enhancing 
the efficiency of airspace capacity and usage by the efficient 
use of runways, increases the safety by providing real-time 
information regarding the aircraft position, velocity etc. to 
both pilots and ATC. It automatically provides traffic call-
outs and provides warnings of an upcoming potential runway 
incursion. In addition, the implementation, and maintenance 
of the system is cost efficient compared with the radar-based 
system. It is efficient in areas where radar is unavailable or 
ineffective, and increases the situational awareness, and 
reduces the workload (CASA, 2012 and Richards, Brien, & 
Miller, 2010, p. 7-10). Due to the complete surveillance 
technology for commercial operators, it provides both fuel 
and time savings (FAA, 2017, a), enables the airlines to fly 
direct routes and reduce the ticket cost per passenger by flying 
at more efficient altitudes and speeds with uninterrupted 
climbs and descents. It also reduces the environmental impact 
by decreasing the emissions from engines, reduces the noise 
through continuous descent and curved approaches (Richards 
et al., 2010). 
Today’s systems are highly complex with human-machine 
interface, machine-machine interface and prone to hazards 
that results in mishaps. ADS-B is one such highly complex 
system. The ADS-B specific components such as ADS-B IN 
and ADS-B OUT are integrated to develop a complete system 
which is dependent on external systems such as navigation 
systems, communication, and different operators/consumers. 
As different systems are interlinked with each other there is a 
probability for errors and failures to occur at any stage/ 
system such as navigation system, avionic components that 
are both air borne and those that are at the ground stations, 
data linking and processing unit, transmission, reception etc. 
Hence system safety is is important for any type of project. 
Ericson (2015) defined system safety as the “process of 
managing the system, personnel, environmental, and health 
mishap risks encountered in the design development, test, 
production, use, and disposal of systems, subsystems, 
equipment, materials, and facilities”. The main aim is to 
eliminate the hazards that might result in the loss of the 
system, injury, death, and environmental damage. The main 
intention of system safety is the mishap risk management by 
identifying the hazards and mitigating them. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is defined as a safety 
analysis tool that is used for identifying hazards, related 
causal factors and hazardous effects, risk level, and which 
provides mitigating design measures (Ericson, 2015). PHA 
evaluates the system design at the preliminary level without 
comprehensive information and it comes under the 
Preliminary Design Hazard Analysis Type (PD-HAT). The 
main aim of the PHA is to analyze the hazards that are 
identified in the Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) and to 
identify previously unrecognized hazards early in the system 
development. It identifies the hazard causal factors, 
consequences, and relative risk associated with the initial 
design concept. The PHA is applicable to the “analysis of all 
types of systems, facilities, operations, and functions and can 
be performed on a unit, subsystem, system, or an integrated 
set of systems” (Ericson, 2005, p. 74).  
Based on FAA’s Capstone Safety Engineering Report #1 - 
ADS-B Radar-Like Services (FAA, 2000),  FAA’s Capstone 
Phase II RNAV Preliminary Hazard Analysis Status Report 
(FAA, 2003), and the Capability Safety Assessment report 
(Joint Planning and Development Office  [JPDO], 2012) the 
hazards relate to ADS-B were identified, and preliminary 
hazard list (PHL) was prepared. Based on the PHL the 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was conducted for the 
hazards related to ADS-B IN Avionics hazards, ADS-B OUT 
Ground hazards, ADS-B OUT Avionics hazards, 
Environmental Hazards and hazards that occur due to human 
error and the results of PHA alone were provided in Table 1. 
As the ADS-B system is very complex, out of the different 
hazard categories identified, this paper discusses only the 
hazards that occur due to human error especially three hazards 
namely pilot error, ATC error, and error that occurs due to 
miscommunication of both and was further analyzed using the 
fault tree analysis methodology (Ericson, 2015).   
Fig.4 represents the Fault Tree Analysis of Loss of separation 
that might occur due to the error in aircraft, ground station 
(ATC) and miscommunication between air and ground 
operations. With regard to the loss of separation, the causes 
were related to the error that occurs in aircraft due to pilot, 
error that might occur due to miscommunication between pilot 
and ATC and error that occur in ground station due to ATC. 
All the links are connected with an OR node as any of those 
factors can cause the loss of separation. 
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Table.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System 
Generic Hazard Evaluation (PHA) 
System : Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System 
No Hazard description Cause Effect IM
RI  
Preventive actions / 
Mitigation 
FMRI  
ADS-B IN Avionics Hazards 
IN AVH 
1 
Loss of data which 
might affect the 
ADS-B IN 
application. 
Failure of aircraft’s 
ADS-B receiver.  
Situational awareness will 
be reduced. 
1D Back up Ground radar 
station/ On board 
establishment of ADS-B 
receiver. 
3C 
IN AVH 
2 Aircraft position 
might not be correct. 
Receiver antenna 
collapses. 
ADS-B might provide 
wrong navigational aids 
and result in false 
situational awareness. 
1C Regular maintenance 
Ground Radar 
station/Development of 
GPS Based back tools  
3D 
IN AVH 
3 
Loss of data to ADS-
B IN application. 
Receiver antenna 
malfunction. 
Situational awareness will 
be reduced. 
1D Regular calibration and 
maintenance/backbone 
ATC Radar Stations 
3D 
IN AVH 
4 
Track of aircraft 
might not be 
displayed to the pilot. 
Failure of the 
systems that 
connects ADS-B 
receiver and other 
application systems 
Situational awareness will 
be reduced & affect pilot. 
1B Use ATC  Radar Stations 3C 
IN AVH 
5 
System hangs 
suddenly. 
Failure of CDTI 
display 
Situational awareness will 
be reduced & affect pilot. 
1C Reboot the system. A 
second Back up system 
like IPAD with Flash 
Memory  is recommended  
3D 
IN AVH 
6 
Aircraft position 
might not be correct. 
May remain for a 
long time. 
Malfunction of the 
ADS-B report 
assembly systems. 
ADS-B might provide 
wrong navigational aids 
and result in false 
situational awareness. 
1B Use Manual Nav Aids 
like GPS. For route 
mapping/Regular testing 
of the software, identify 
the bug that cause the 
error and resolve the issue 
by debugging. 
4B 
IN AVH 
7 
Related to human 
factor/error. 
Pilots lack of 
experience about the 
system 
functionalities 
Results in undesirable 
events. 
2C Provide efficient and 
comprehensive training to 
the crew/engage Auto 
pilot 
4D 
ADS-B OUT  Ground Hazards 
O GH 1 Loss of data which 
have an impact on the 
controller inputs. 
Power supply failure  ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
2D Back up UPS facility 
should be provided. 
4B 
O GH 2 Due to corruption it 
display wrong data to 
controller. 
Error in the data link  Without the awareness of 
the controller it lead to 
break down in separation 
and affect all the aircraft. 
2C Regular Firmware 
updates/Anti Virus 
Protection maintenance 
and calibration. 
3B 
O GH 3 Position of aircraft 
might be affected. 
Error in data 
decoding process 
Without the awareness of 
the controller it lead to 
break down in separation 
and affect all the aircraft. 
2D Identifying & debugging 
should be done to resolve 
the bug that causes the 
decoding error. 
3D 
O GH 4 Abrupt loss of data 
that might affect the 
controllers work. 
Failure of data link 
between controller 
working position 
and ground station 
ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
2C Provision of back up and 
availability of different 
links. 
4B 
O GH 5 Due to corruption 
displays incorrect 
data to the controller. 
Error in the ADS-B 
Receiver 
Without the awareness of 
the controller it lead to 
break down in separation 
and affect all the aircraft. 
2C Regular maintenance and 
testing. 
3B 
ADS-B OUT Avionic Hazards 
O AVH 
1 
Failure of GPS time 
input will cause 
Failure of GPS 
Clock 
Affect all the aircraft as it 
lead to incorrect intent 
2B Data verification system 
should be installed. 
3C 
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unexpected loss of 
time synchronisation. 
data. 
O AVH 
2 
Sends corrupted 
position data to 
ADSB emitter. 
Error in GPS 
receiver unit 
There might be error in 
the display of the position 
of the aircraft and it might 
lead to break down in 
separation. 
2C Availability of back up 
receiver. 
3B 
O AVH 
3 
Position data will not 
be sent to ADS-B 
emitter. 
Malfunction of GPS 
receiver  
ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
2C Back up facility for the 
navigational system on 
board. 
4C 
O AVH 
4 
Loss of ADS-B 
position data affects 
the controller input. 
Failure of GPS 
antenna 
ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
3B Back up facility for the 
navigational system on 
board. 
4B 
O AVH 
5 
Positional accuracy 
will be lost. 
Error of accuracy 
performance 
equipment in the 
aircraft 
Error with regard to the 
position of the aircraft 
displayed. 
3C Regular CALIBRATION 
maintenance and testing. 
4C 
O AVH 
6 
Altitude data 
transmitted to 
ADS-B emitter might 
be wrong. 
Malfunction of 
Altitude encoder 
 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2C Altitude quality indicator 
alerts. Regular 
maintenance and testing. 
 
3D 
O AVH 
7 
Altitude data 
transmitted to ADS-B 
emitter might be 
corrupted. 
Altitude sensing 
fails 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2C Altitude quality indicator 
alerts. Regular 
maintenance and testing. 
3D 
O AVH 
8 
Position of the 
aircraft displayed 
might be incorrect. 
 
Error in 
Transponder/ ADS-
B emitter 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2B Installation of data 
validity mechanism on 
board.  
3C 
O AVH 
9 
Loss of data which 
might affect the 
controller. 
Failure of aircraft’s 
transponder/emitter  
ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
3C Back up transponder/ 
emitter. 
4C 
O AVH 
10 
Altitude data not 
transmitted to ADS-B 
emitter. 
Malfunction of 
Altimeter  
Data related to altitude is 
not transmitted. ATC 
should revert back to 
procedural control. 
2C Data from GPS can be 
used as back up. 
3C 
O AVH 
11 
Loss of data which 
might affect the 
controller. 
Malfunction of 
ADS-B Out Antenna  
ATC has to reassess the 
traffic by transitioning 
back to procedural 
control. Increases the 
workload. Situational 
awareness is lost. 
3B Back up. 4C 
O AVH 
12 
Broadcasted data 
might be incorrect. 
Deterioration of  
ADS-B Out Antenna 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2D Installation of data 
validity mechanism on 
board and at ground 
station. 
3D 
O AVH 
13 
Error in the display of 
aircraft position. 
Data corruption 
during transportation 
might result in 
broadcasting 
incorrect data 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2C Installation of data 
validity mechanism on 
board and at ground 
station.  
3B 
O AVH 
14 
Broadcasting of 
incorrect data. 
Data encoding 
process error 
Without the awareness of 
ATC it might lead to 
break down in separation. 
2C Identifying & debugging 
should be done to resolve 
the bug that causes the 
decoding error. 
3B 
O AVH 
15 
Total ADS-B service 
loss. 
Failure of Satellite ADS-B tracks not 
displayed on ATC 
2B Back up of navigation 
aids on board. 
3C 
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console. 
O AVH 
16 
Distortion of data and 
interruption of 
signals. 
Interference by 
Radio Frequency 
Without the awareness of 
ATC and pilot the error in 
the aircraft position might 
lead to break down in 
separation. 
2C Installation of data 
validity mechanism on 
board and at ground 
station. 
3B 
Environmental Hazards 
EH 1 Data might be 
corrupted. 
Aircraft external 
equipment, and 
outdoor equipment 
at the ground station 
might be affected by 
the extreme weather 
conditions 
 
Lead to loss of separation 
or navigation. 
1B Use GPS/Regular 
maintenance and 
calibration. 
3A 
EH 2 Inaccurate data. Limited forecast of 
the weather 
Lead to loss of separation 
or navigation. 
1D Use GPS/Increasing the 
facility. 
3B 
EH 3 Lack of data or 
inaccurate data. 
Limited number of 
weather reporting 
stations 
Lead to loss of separation 
or navigation. 
2B Establishing more 
reporting stations. 
3C 
EH 2 Data unavailability. Lack of coverage 
 
Lead to loss of separation 
or navigation. 
2C Increasing the area 
coverage or setting up of 
new reporting stations. 
3B 
Hazards due to Human error 
HH 1 Data - not 
broadcasted. 
Inappropriate use – 
Pilot might set the 
transponder at a 
wrong mode 
Increases the workload 
due to the transition back 
to procedural control. 
Loss of situational 
awareness. 
3B Reminder by co-pilot or 
through the navigation 
document. 
4B 
HH 2 Before take-off pilot 
might enter the 
wrong pressure in 
altimeter 
Lack of proficiency 
– wrong pressure 
adjust value given 
by ATC 
Collision on ground or 
air. 
3C If pilot repeats the value 
or if the controller is 
experienced it can be 
mitigated. 
4B 
HH 3 Pilot enters wrong 
pressure in altimeter. 
Lack of proficiency 
– error in altimeter 
setting by pilot 
Collision on ground or 
air. 
3C Double checking the 
altimeter setting. 
4D 
HH 4 Affects all 
operations. 
Lack of proficiency 
– Inadequate 
knowledge of ADS-
B system 
Loss of separation. 3B Adequate training on new 
systems. 
4B 
HH 5 Pilot enters wrong 
pressure in altimeter. 
Missed 
communication – 
Pilot mishears the 
pressure adjust value 
given by ATC 
Collision on ground or 
air. 
3C If pilot repeats the value it 
can be mitigated. 
4D 
HH 6 Attaching the label to 
wrong flight. 
Lack of situational 
awareness by ATC – 
incorrect Callsign in 
flight plan 
Increases the workload of 
the controller due to 
incorrect coupling. 
3D Controller should cross 
check the flight plan. 
4D 
HH 7 Incorrect coupling 
with flight plan. 
Lack of situational 
awareness by Pilot – 
in correct Callsign in 
FMS 
Broadcasting of incorrect 
data. 
3D Reminder by co-pilot or 
through the navigation 
document. 
4B 
HH 8 ATC might be 
confused by the 
values displayed 
based on geometric 
and barometric 
levels. 
Confusion – 
different altitude 
sources displayed 
might confuse ATC 
Different display lead to 
confusion. 
3D Compulsory training 
regarding the function of 
the ADS-B systems. 
4C 
HH 9 ATC might apply 
either radar or ADS-
B separation standard 
to the flight plan. 
Confusion – Due to 
radar and ADS-B 
tracks ATC might be 
confused 
Incorrect separation. 3D Compulsory training 
regarding the function of 
the ADS-B systems. 
4B 
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The contributing factors for the pilot error were the incorrect 
input entered by the pilot to the flight control and failure to 
follow the assigned four-dimensional trajectory. This is linked 
by OR node as any of this two can lead to loss of separation 
and with regard to incorrect input to flight control the factors 
that contribute together are the lack of proficiency, distraction, 
fatigue and confusion of the pilot due to mixed equipment, 
display color in the cockpit etc. As they contribute 
individually to the mishap they are linked by OR node. While 
the factors such as wake avoidance, traffic avoidance, and 
weather avoidance contribute individually to the failure to 
follow the assigned 4D trajectory hazard they are connected 
by OR node.  
The error that occurs due to miscommunication between air 
and ground stations are – when pilot mishears or 
misunderstands the input from ATC and vice-versa, and the 
other factors are data corruption, system malfunction etc. 
The error in the ground station that occurs due to ATC is the 
lack of proficiency, distraction, error in entering the inputs, 
and confusion due to mixed equipment such as radar and 
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       OR node 
 
 
 OR node  
 
   
 
 
 OR node     OR node 
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Fig.4. FTA of the human factors of ADS-B System  
Pilot Error Error from ATC 
Error due to 
miscommunication 
Loss of Separation 
 
Enters incorrect input to 
flight control 
Lack of 
proficiency 
Distraction Fatigue 
Fails to follow the 
assigned 4 
dimensional trajectory  
Wake avoidance  
Traffic avoidance Weather 
avoidance 
Pilot mishears 
/misunderstands the 
input from ATC 
ATC mishears/ 
misunderstands the 
information from pilot 
Lack of 
proficiency 
Error in entering 
inputs 
Confusion due to mixed 
equipment (radar, ADS-B) 
Distraction  
Confusion due to mixed 
equipment (radar, ADS-B), 
display color. 
 
Error in aircraft 
Error in ground 
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Data corruption, 
system 
malfunction 
 International Journal of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering 
Volume 5 – No.2, April 2018 
17 
ISSN (O): 2393-8609 
ADS-B. As any of these issues might lead to loss of 
separation it is linked by OR node. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the PHA, the hazards that are ranked as 1B, 1C, and 
1D, are unacceptable risks; those that are ranked as 2B, 2C, 
and 2D are having high risk which needs more attention, and 
continuous monitoring; hazards that are ranked as 3A, 3B, 3C, 
and 3D have medium risks but should not be ignored while 
4B, 4C, and 4 D have low risks which need occasional 
inspection and maintenance. If the preventive measures 
specified in this report are done properly the risks can be 
reduced to a greater extent.  
With regard to the hazards related to human errors analyzed 
using FTA, the best recommendation would be to provide a 
relevant mandatory training to both pilots and ATC officers 
with regard to technology, situational awareness, awareness 
about the loss of separation, safety aspects regarding the air-
ground communications systems, decision making, and crew 
resource management. Other solutions would be to encourage 
and mandate both the pilot and ATC to use high quality 
communication systems, Transponders (Mode C and Mode S) 
and ACAS. Training can be provided with regard to ground 
safety nets such as Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), Area 
Proximity Warning (APW), Minimum Safe Altitude Warning 
(MSAW), and Approach Path Monitor (APM). With regard to 
air-borne safety nets, training can be provided with regard to 
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), Ground 
Proximity Warning System (GPWS), High Energy Approach 
Monitoring Systems, and Runway Overrun Protection 
Systems (ROPS). Above all, depending on their designation a 
recurrent training should be mandated to prove their currency 
and a type rating should be mandated for ADS-B technology 
usage. If these training and ratings were implemented it would 
play a major role in reducing the ADS-B related mishaps. 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this digital age, the aviation industry is becoming more and 
more sophisticated with the emerging new technologies such 
as ADS-B, Head-Up Displays (HUDs), Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS), Digital voice and Controller-Pilot 
Data Link Communications (CPDLC), Cockpit Display of 
Traffic Information, Textual and graphical Flight Information 
Service (FIS) data link and Onboard terrain, obstacle and 
noise-impacted area databases. These technologies serve as an 
efficient tool in collaborative decision making when it is 
integrated into Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems and 
used by the pilots, and controllers. ADS-B is the new 
surveillance technology which is proposed to be flight-deck 
based system to support a wide range of aircraft-based 
separation applications during flight operations and provide 
collision avoidance protection when operating on the airport 
surface.  
The important issue with this technology is how the 
information can be utilized effectively by different users such 
as pilots, controllers, dispatchers, and vehicle operators within 
their relevant responsibilities. The human factor issues are the 
acceptance and utilization by pilots and controllers, building a 
collaborative work ethic between pilots, controllers, and 
certification authorities, and how to delegate their roles and 
responsibilities for safe operation of the aircraft. Especially, 
with regard to the separation process which is evaluated using 
the FTA methodology in this paper, there are three approaches 
that can be adapted. The first approach is that the separation 
responsibility must be always with the controller. The second 
approach emphasizes that with accurate real-time information 
the responsibility can be shared partially between the pilot and 
ATC especially during en route phase. The third approach is 
that flight crew can modify and coordinate their preferred or 
desired routines to the ATC for approval.  
One of the common perspectives of both the pilot and 
controllers about the ADS-B implementation is regarding the 
responsibility. The certification authorities and the rule 
making team must assign the responsibility in a way that it 
will enhance the overall safety. Safety must be their main 
concern in developing new policies to define the 
responsibility and liability of the users.  Attempts should be 
made to include and insist the basic principles of situational 
awareness as part of the advanced decision making training 
for pilots and controllers. If the mitigation measures and 
proper training suggested in this study is implemented, the 
accidents that might occur due to human error can be reduced 
significantly. ADS-B technology provides the chance to 
reduce the separation standards, increase the efficiency and 
capacity of the air space and flight operations, provides 
flexibility, and enhances the situational awareness. 
Simultaneously, it plays a significant role in enhancing the 
environmental quality by reducing the emissions, noise and 
helps to save economically by reducing the fuel cost. The real 
challenge which is ahead of the aviation industry is 
developing an air traffic management system by integrating 
the human component and assigning the responsibilities 
among pilots and controllers and making the entire system to 
function efficiently. 
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